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Historical Evolution and Future of Natural Resources Law and Policy:
The Beginning of An Argument And Some Modest Predictions
Sally K. Fairfax, Helen Ingram, and Leigh Raymond
The purpose of this paper is to locate the evolution of natural resource law and policy
within the larger evolution of Americans’ understanding of government and property; and
to use the trajectory of that evolution to suggest some likely patterns of future
developments. In this discussion we follow closely the role of science and property in the
centralization of control over land and water.
I.

The Trajectory in Six Eras

1. The First Hundred Years
The Articles of Confederation--Limits on its powers did not stop the Confederated
Congress from taking initial steps toward establishing the Army Corps of Engineers, or
deter the Congress from adopting a series of General Land Ordinances 1 in 1785 and 1787
domain.
Property rights of the era were grounded in the ideas of John Locke: ownership was
frequently defended based on individual labor and frequently conceived of in relation to
concrete, material objects – in particular, to land. 2 The vision of property as a highly
divisible “bundle of sticks” with separable rights moving among multiple owners would
not arrive for another 100 years. 3 In the humid eastern colonies, property rights in water
were tied to ownership of the land, a right to reasonable use of whatever flowed past or
fell from the sky. 4 Similarly, management was closely tied to ownership: what the man
and his slaves or workers did on the man’s farm.
The Federal Constitution--The Constitution created small concrete steps toward and
enormous potential for centralization. It recognized the federal government’s right to
own and manage western territories, albeit temporarily. The federal government’s role
was originally understood as limited to the rights of a “mere proprietor,” 5 plus the
responsibility for the “primary disposal of the soil,” to assure the orderly development of
1

Once you have read Gates, History of Public Land Law Development (1968), especially Chapters 1 and 3,
the best sources are from the acts’ bicentennial period: Peter S. Onuf, Statehood and Union: A History of
the Northwest Ordinance (1986); Robert M. Taylor, Jr., The Northwest Ordinance 1787: A Bicentennial
Handbook (1987), and John J. Patrick, Lessons on the Northwest Ordinance (1986).
2
William B. Scott, In Pursuit of Happiness: American Conceptions of Property from the Seventeenth to the
Twentieth Century (1977); R. Jeffrey Lustig, Corporate Liberalism: The Origins of Modern American
Political Theory, 1890-1920 (1982).
3
Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960 (1992); Eric T. Freyfogle, The
Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 77 (1995)
4
Riparian doctrine was not all that simple but the basics were familiar and imported from England. But
see, regarding more arid, Spanish colonies of the same general period, Sonya Lipsett-Rivera. To Defend
Our Water with the Blood of Our Veins: The Struggle for Resources in Colonial Puebla (1999). .
5
Cowart and Fairfax. “Public Lands Federalism: Judicial Theory and Administrative Reality," 15 Ecology
Law Quarterly 375 (1988)

the western territories. That is, in Article I, Congress was authorized to make all rules
regarding to whom and on what terms the public domain would pass into state or private
ownership. The federal government as primary disposer began rather free handedly and
remained that way well into the 20th century.
On the other side of the land coin, government authority over private property was
limited in part by the Fifth Amendment. Until the late 19th century, the dominant Fifth
Amendment issue related to the justness of compensation: the courts weighed “givings”
against takings to assess a transaction’s “just-ness.” 6
Surprising, perhaps, since the Constitution does not mention water, Congress early on
took a more activist role regarding early water policy. Water management was rooted in
science long before George Perkins Marsh and the Progressive era. The Corps of
Engineers was the only formally trained body of scientists in the new republic. Further,
the as part of the nation's small army, the Corps was available to serve the wishes of
Congress and the executive branch. 7 Enthusiasm for federal subsidies was a very early
pattern in natural resource law and policy: politicians wanted the Corps to undertake
both military construction and works “of a civil nature." 8 Familiar elements of the
ACE’s current profile were carved in stone by the 1824 Supreme Court ruling in Gibbons
v. Ogden. Centralization, scientization and subsidies were early defined by water policy.
2. Post- Civil War—Industrialization, Expansion, and the Corporation
American’s points of reference for life changed radically, 9 and expectations of
government changed accordingly. Well-organized and diverse private interests followed
the ACE model and lobbied Congress for programs that would meet their priorities.
As the 19th century closed, federal authority over public land expanded under a more
expansive reading of the ambiguous Article I property clause combined with the federal
government’s equally ambiguous Article IV power of “exclusive legislation” over forts,

6

See for starters, the ubiquitous but controversial Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Giving and
Taking of Property (Forthcoming 2007). See also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The
Uselessness of Public Use, 106 Colum. L. Rev. (Forthcoming); Taking Compensation Private, 59 Stan. L.
Rev. (Forthcoming). Of Property and Federalism, 115 Yale L. J. 72 (2005); A Theory of Property, 90
Cornell L. Rev. 531 (2005); Of Property and Anti-Property, 102 Mich.L. Rev. 1 (2004); Not Just
Compensation, 13 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 29 (2003); Givings, 111 Yale L. J. 547 (2001).
7
The Corps history is adapted, cut and pasted from http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/history/beg last visited
April 8. 2007.
8

The Corps history is adapted, cut and pasted from http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/history/beg last visited
April 8. 2007.
9

A good general source is LAND RIGHTS: THE 1990’S PROPERTY RIGHTS REBELLION (Bruce Yandle ed.
1995), especially Nancie G. Marzulla, The Property Rights Movement: How it Began and Where it is
Headed 1-30. See also N. Ehrenreich, A Trend?: The Progressive Potential in Privatization, 73 DENV. U.
L. REV. 1235 (1996).
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arsenals and similar land acquired by the government for specific purposes. 10 The federal
government morphed from a mere proprietor to a proprietor plus to a sovereign in a series
of court cases starting with Camfield in 1897. 11 Acquisition of land by the federal
government for similar purposes was soon to follow. 12
3. The Progressive Era 13
The transformative power of the railroads gave rise to new ways of organizing capital
flows, natural resource consumption, industrial management, and property.
Progressive activists relied on the idea of scientific management to expand government
agencies like the Forest Service 14 and the Reclamation Service and to consolidate their
control over vast portions of the federal estate. 15 The imported and putatively scientific
field of forestry gave legitimacy to some centralization, [Light (1911) 16 and Grimaud
(1911) 17] even during the Supreme Court’s Lochner era efforts to stem the rising tide of
unscientific social regulation. 18
Federal subsidies of water development and irrigation intensified. Yet the apparently
centralizing era is complicated by the fact that the federal reclamation crusade soon had
to relinquish control to compromise with water users. 19 Similarly, the apparent severance
of the federal property owner’s riparian water rights from the public domain lands made
room for the ascendancy of state administered prior appropriation systems to replace
riparian rights in most western jurisdictions. 20
Underwriting these complex developments was an equally complexifying notion of
property, which morphed from its Lockean roots to permit both federal initiatives and
10

Discussed, with appropriate brevity in L. Raymond and S. K. Fairfax. Fragmentation of Public Domain
Law and Policy: An Alternative to the ‘Shift to Retention’ Thesis. 39 Natural Resources Journal 649-753
(1999). See also, Fairfax, et al, Buying Nature, at .
and will less brevity in the materials cited therein. Originally the federal government was not viewed as
having the power of eminent domain within states. The states acquired what lands the feds needed within
their boundaries and donated it to the central government. That changed in 1888.
11
Camfield v. U. S., 167 U.S. 518 (1897)
12
Fairfax et al., Buying Nature at ____ (2005).
13
For our basic view of the progressive era, see L. Raymond and S. Fairfax, Fragmentation of Public
Domain Law and Policy, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 649 (1999), at 656-660 and references cited therein. See
also, SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY (1959) and ROBERT H. WIEBE,
THE SEARCH FOR ORDER: 1877-1920 (1967).
14
Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency (1999).
15
Raymond and Fairfax, supra at 669-671. For more detailed treatments, see James Q. Wilson, The Rise of
the Bureaucratic State, 41 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 77 (1975), or STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW
AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 (1982).
16
Light v. US, 220 US 523 (1911)
17
U S v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
18
The legislative fall out from The Octopus and the rise of the US Forest Service may have passed judicial
scrutiny because they were scientific. Just a hypothesis.
19
According to Karen Smith, excessive costs resulted for the Federal government because there were not
adequate numbers of settlers to occupy the newly irrigated lands in Nevada. The Magnificent Experiment:
Building the Salt River Project, 1880-1917. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1986.
20
Robert G. Dunbar, Forging New Rights in Western Waters (1983).
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corporate expansion. Modern corporations pushed the law to recognize a growing
division of labor between owners (the shareholders), who held the right to a company’s
revenue, and managers who exercised primary control over the day-to-day operation of
the company.
Supreme Court decisions giving private entrepreneurs something close to ownership of “a
particular legal environment” considerably expanded the scope of private property
beyond land and material goods. 21 Populist and progressive reformers alike contested
many of these changes. 22 Ironically, the courts also thwarted the corporate grasp on the
Chicago waterfront, 23 and invented a federal quasi-appropriative water right to bolster
federal land reservations for Native Americans.
4. The Depression
The Depression can be understood as the ultimate flowering of progressive era ideas: 24
the Progressive era’s centralization and faith in scientific expertise peaked as the feds
moved front and center in natural resource, water, and land use planning. Agricultural
relief programs allowed the federal government assumed the right to adjust almost any
ownership pattern what was not socially and economically optimal, Lockean property
rights bottomed out. 25
But the Taylor Grazing Act 26 underscores that this Progressive era overlay on a
profoundly Lockean tradition of property, not an about face but a complication of
ownership. To illustrate, under the 1934 Taylor Grazing Act, the newly created Division
of Grazing was very keen to continue recognizing Lockean based claims to control over
the public domain, as mitigated by important egalitarian and subsistence considerations.

4. The Environmental Era
Depression Era enthusiasm for centralized government science lasted through the first
heady days of the 1970s and then petered out as science complexified as a source of
government authority. Environmentalists generally followed the established path to
Washington to address the growing concerns with air and water quality. But
21

Morton Horowitz. The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy
(1992).
22
Indeed, it is fair to observe that the federal and state legislatures were encouraged by progressive
reformers and discouraged by the Supreme Court regarding regulation of the expansive economy in what is
now somewhat controversially called the Lochner Era. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87
Colum. L. Rev. 873 (1987). But compare the conservative reposte, for example, Bernstein, David E.,
"Lochner's Legacy's Legacy" . George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-15 Available at
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=394861 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.394861
23
Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois , 146 U.S. 387 (1892)
24
The standard conceptualization is either that FDR completed TR’s mission (Swain) or displaced it with a
new vision (Schlesinger).
25
Buying Nature, discussing Wooton. This was virtually always to the advantage of the owners however,
See the discussion of the Weeks Act and its Depression Era expansion, supra.
26
43 U.S.C. §§ 315-316o, June 28, 1934,
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simultaneously, they challenged government science in wilderness debates, grazing
debates, the clear cutting controversy and ever more generally.
With astonishing speed, the federal government passed one major statue after another in
the post-Earth Day fervor of the era, dramatically enhancing central authority over many
aspects of our lives. Suddenly, scientific experts at the newly constituted Environmental
Protection Agency were charged with setting acceptable levels of air and water pollution
without regard to cost or industry concern.
Yet, the public lands agencies found themselves embroiled in public controversy over the
recreational and increasingly ecological effects of standard management practices. The
National Forest Management Act 27 (NFMA), the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act 28 (FLPMA) imposed a complex, comprehensive, long-term resource assessment on
federal managers. The planning mandated public involvement and opened the agencies
to public scrutiny. 29 An energized judicial reading of the APA 30 and NEPA subjected all
federal agencies to intense public and judicial scrutiny as scientific bureaucracy gave
way.
And, yet again, the limits of environmental movement became clear when Jimmy Carter
had to rescind his plan for cutting funding for eighteen ongoing water projects. However,
more arduous economic and environmental reviews were instituted, and a precedent of
“no new starts” of additional projects was established in 1981, although the Corps did
continue to get money for “preauthorization studies” 31. The tougher standards of
evaluation along with the fact that most good dam sites had already been used suggested
that the era of big days was over.
6. The Regan Revolution
Regan and his successors moved into this growing complexity by exalting markets and
private property and discouraging confidence in government action and regulation. While
Reagan failed to dismantle the federal regulatory infrastructure of the 1970s, his efforts
undermined its credibility. The tuna-porpoise debates at the WTO suggested, moreover,
that perhaps it did not matter what Congress said. 32
27
6 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614, August 17, 1974, as amended 1976, 1978, 1980, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1988 and
1990.
28
43 U.S. C. §35. Described from the Bureau of Land Management’s perspective in The Federal Land
Policy and Management Act as Amended available at http://www.blm.gov/flpma/FLPMA.pdf
29
Achterman, G.L. and S.K. Fairfax. The Public Participation Requirements of the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act. 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1979).
30
See generally, Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667, 1682-83, 1713-15 (1975). See also, Scenic Hudson v FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
31
Jeanne Nienaber Clarke and Daniel C McCool, Staking Out the Terrain: Power and Performance Among
Natural Resources Agencies ,Albany: Statue University of New York Press, 1996.
32
Perrin, William F., CHRONOLOGICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF
THE TUNA-DOLPHIN PROBLEM, 1941-2001. NOAA Technical Memorandum NOAA-NMFS-SWFSC356, 194pp. (2004)
. Available on the web at
http://swfsc.noaa.gov/uploadedFiles/Divisions/PRD/Programs/ETP_Cetacean_Assessment/TPBiblio.pdf .
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Not helping matters any was a growing sense of concern over whether federal scientists
were really as non-partisan or as competent as we all had hoped. 33 Spurred by early
skeptics like Ashley Schiff, 34 critics of the public land agencies increasingly wondered if
the federal scientists had the right ideas on basic issues like fire management to species
conservation to pesticide use. Ever more prominent and more intense conflicts over good
versus “junk” science helped to further weaken public faith in scientific experts at the
federal level and otherwise. 35
But a large part of the conversation had moved to regulation on private lands: a series of
modest Fifth Amendment victories 36 encouraged more market-based alternatives to
conservation increasingly being promoted by free market thinkers of the period. 37
Land trusts touted “private” land conservation without government acquisition or
regulation. 38 Common rights in resources were routinely marketized: environmental
groups have paid ranchers for livestock killed by endangered wolves, for example, and
have tried to bid on grazing permits and timber sales as conservation buyers. 39 Others
have bitterly resisted this ongoing “commodification” of nature. 40
Rumors of the demise of public regulation over private land were exaggerated.
Nevertheless, the reluctance to use the full force of the federal regulatory hammer,
especially on private lands, was increasingly palpable and the search for more
collaborative, and creative, alternatives to increasingly intractable conflicts was
growing. 41
The final result, as our story nears the present, is complexity. Hundreds of local groups
organized around watersheds have tried, with uneven success, to manage their mixtures
of federal and/or private lands better than commodity users or federal managers could do
alone. 42 Some have firmly excluded the feds from the process (e.g. the Quincy Library
Group), while others have included them closely (The Land Trust Alliance) but they are
all searching for more collaborative, less confrontational ways to manage natural
resources that span various institutional boundaries. 43 And, despite the best efforts of
conservative politicians and their allies, there has been no swing back to a happier time of
33

Herbert Kaufmann, “Revolutions in the Doctrine of Public Administration.” APSR 1954.
Ashley Schiff, Fire and Water: Scientific Heresy in the U.S. Forest Service. (1962)
35
See Samuel Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States 19551985 (2004)
36
A limerick on the subject would have to include First English, Lucas, Dolan, and Nolan.
37
Anderson and Leal, FME.
38
Raymond and Fairfax (2002) supra.
39
Sally K. Fairfax and Andrea Issod, “Trust Principles as a Tool for Grazing Reform: Learning from Four
State Cases.” 33 Environmental Law (2003).
40
For a nice sample of this, see Timothy Luke, Ecocritique (1997), especially chapter 3 on The Nature
Conservancy.
41
Oliver Houck, (1993); DeWitt John, Civic Environmentalism (1994), Craig Thomas, Bureaucratic
Landscapes (2003) on NCCP example of all this.
42
Douglas Kenney here?
43
Fairfax et al. (2005) penultimate chapter (thinking of that park in DC if you want to riff here Sally – or
Whidbey up in Washington?)
34
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private rights ascendant. There has been instead a profusion of actors, and arrangements,
and institutions resulting in growing mosaics of conservation and use on the ground.
Part III. The Next 50 Years: Where Does our Trajectory Take Us
1. Review: So Where Are We Now, Approximately?
a. Goals of Natural Resources Law and Policy
Government and public goals have varied enormously during our trajectory. However,
since the very first, private and then corporate quest for profit has never varied. Neither
has the basic policy tool: subsidies—in the form of give aways or regulations that burden
the opposition have dominated policy.
b. Science and Natural Resource Policy
The government science that justified a growing federal role has departed the field.
Science is now recognized as plural, uncertain, and branded by the contexts in which it is
produced. 44 The result is more complexity.
c. Property
After years of embracing markets and “blurring” the distinction between public and
private property, policy entrepreneurs are now talking actively about the National or
Global Commons being owned equally by citizens of a given state or the world. 45 This
“intrinsic” right to natural resources based simply on equal human rights is ironically but
substantially Lockean. 46 Also ironic is the fact that such ideas could usher in an era of
stronger asserted public control over natural resources like public lands and water, rather
than weaker, even as public institutions implement those controls through market-based
mechanisms.
IV. Where Do These Trajectories Take Us
Global climate change will impose new priorities on government that will further erode
public confidence in political processes: resources will be managed to prevent the
disasters, flood, fire, intense storms, coastal inundation and inadequate potable water.
This new goal set will further discredit political decision making that is already under
assault from incompetence, corruption, dishonesty and public recognition of all of those
things.

44

The Data Quality Act snuck through Congress as Sec. 515 of the Treasury and General Government
Appropriations Act for 2001 (Public Law 106-554). It names a problem that it solves
45
Barnes (2001)
46
Climate change: see Agarwal and Narain (1991), Shue (1993); minerals, see Raymond (2007); water, see
New Yorker article on Bechtel in Bolivia (get cite)
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The comprehensive long range planning, ecosystem management, sustainability, and
other slogans of the late 20th century government resource programs will fall of their own
weight: we simply cannot afford the science required or the monitoring that ostensibly
follows. The era of strong, centralized, scientific government control of public resources
is ending, being replaced in part by an era of markets.
We anticipate that the dominant resource problem, the one that will shape institutions will
be a growing crisis in water availability. As this arena becomes increasingly marketized,
science will provide less succor for advocates of public decision making.
That is not to say that science will disappear as an element of decision making. Although
science wars were once thought to discredit all science, increasing controversy has
appeared to democratize science so that citizen scientists collect their own data and do
their own monitoring. Science is no longer a trump card, but one will still have to have
some to have a winning hand.
Government agencies will not, typically, hold that hand. Instead, the epicenter of 21st
century resource policy and management will be a combination of private property and
the new property described half a century ago by Charles Reich: The right to or ability to
generate government largesse. It is an overstatement to assert that government will
continue to have influence because those who benefit from subsidies will have to cede it
enough authority to continue raising and collecting taxes but that will be a large part of it.
On the other hand, a small but growing trend toward greater collective ownership of
public resources, often expressed through quasi market-based institutions like the “sky
trust,” shows another, more populist and egalitarian side to this ongoing transformation of
public resource management. To what degree these “new” property rights will be
traditional subsidies to powerful interests or more egalitarian forms of common
ownership remains a vital unanswered question.
Given the past 200 years of history, however, it is hard to be optimistic. In this sense, it
seems likely that the political discourse and government priorities for resource
management in general and water in particular will recede in importance. Thus, we wager
on “more of the same” and perhaps much more in the critical area of water policy. As
sea levels rise and extreme weather events become more common, there will be intense
pressure to return to the construction of dams and levees, even though many agree that
such projects do not provide solutions.
It seems unlikely that recently installed public participatory mechanisms will be
dismantled, but the water resources community has a long history of fashioning
multipurpose projects that have something in them that is attractive to nearly every
constituency. More generally, natural resources governance will increasingly become
network activity that associates private property owners, primarily global corporations, in
negotiations with NGOs and governmental actors.
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